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# 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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## Main Committee I

### Summary record of the 3rd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 4 May 2015 at 10 a.m.

*Chair:* Mr. Román-Morey ..... (Peru)

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General exchange of views (*continued*)

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*The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.*

**General exchange of views** (*continued*)

1. **Mr. O'Reilly** (Ireland) said that despite the progress in disarmament since 1995, the 13 steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remained virtually unimplemented and the 2005 Review Conference had not been able to achieve an agreed outcome. Following the examination by the Committee of the implementation of the action points concerning the total elimination of nuclear weapons agreed to in 2010, States parties had an obligation under article VI of the Treaty to decide on the next steps for achieving that goal; there was no opt-out clause or conditionality to that obligation.

2. The decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely in 1995 must be seen as a collective recognition that States parties had failed to achieve the disarmament objectives within the original time frame. Non-nuclear-weapon States were hoping for substantive and constructive discussions in the current Review Conference on the future of negotiations and on the effective measures provided for in the Treaty. There was an argument that modernizing and maintaining nuclear weapons benefitted everyone and, allegedly, ensured the stability of the world order. However, the conflicts raging in many regions suggested that nuclear weapons — and the ever-present risk of nuclear weapon detonation — would completely undermine that stability, possibly for generations. It was therefore questionable whether the retention of nuclear weapons could be reconciled with the unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate nuclear arsenals.

3. While there had been considerable reductions in nuclear arsenals and the number of nuclear weapons was at its lowest level since the height of the cold war, to date, not one weapon from within the five nuclear stockpiles recognized by the Treaty had been eliminated through multilateral negotiations envisaged under article VI. The Treaty contained no arrangements for nuclear disarmament.

4. Given that nuclear weapons were widely judged to be bereft of moral justification and utilitarian value and had been shown to have appalling and indiscriminate destructive capacity, he questioned the reluctance to discuss legal pathways to eliminate them, as all States were obliged to do under the Treaty. In

view of current knowledge on the matter, the international community must determine whether it was prepared to continue to acquiesce to a situation where, sooner or later, a nuclear weapon may be either used or set off accidentally. The compelling evidence about the devastating impact of nuclear weapons could not be ignored, nor could the ever-present risks of a nuclear weapon detonation and the inability of the international system to respond adequately thereto. Those factors underlined the clear and unambiguous Treaty obligation upon all States parties to enter into negotiations leading to effective measures for nuclear disarmament.

5. The working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.9) was a constructive and cogent document which offered two possible pathways for pursuing effective measures for nuclear disarmament but did not seek to prescribe any particular legal instrument to be pursued through discussion between States. However, it was no longer a question of whether those discussions should take place, nor was there any doubt as to the need for an agreed legal pathway to achieving nuclear disarmament.

6. He looked forward to engaging in a substantive discussion on effective measures to that end, which all States parties had undertaken to negotiate. Not only had those negotiations not been pursued or concluded, but they had not even started. Unless that first step was taken, the world without nuclear weapons to which all aspired could not become reality.

7. **Ms. Wairatpanij** (Thailand) said that it was in the interest of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to work together towards the ultimate goal of the complete and total elimination of nuclear weapons. To Thailand, a world free of nuclear weapons meant just that; unfortunately, to some countries, it meant the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. States parties all had a legal responsibility to fulfil their obligations under article VI. It was important to keep working to bring all remaining countries into the Treaty; universal ratification would help guarantee the full realization of the spirit and objectives of the Treaty. States parties must seriously consider the necessary steps for the full implementation of article VI. At the same time, nuclear-weapon States must reaffirm their commitment to taking practical steps towards unequivocal nuclear disarmament.

8. The most dynamic aspect of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference had been the emphasis on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. Committed States parties and civil society should be commended for their persistence and productive contribution to that cause. With the outcomes of the three international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, and the views and information contained in the many working papers submitted to the current Review Conference, the excuse of a lack of evidence-based information to start discussions was invalid.

9. Thailand had co-hosted with the International Law and Policy Institute of Norway a regional round table on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and prospects for a ban treaty in March 2015. The outcome of that round table had only confirmed the need and urgency for discussions with a view to launching the appropriate diplomatic process to address legal gaps. Her delegation called for further focused discussion on the issue and for the Review Conference to consider seriously the outcomes of such conferences and initiatives. That was not only highly recommended, but also a logical imperative and could only serve to strengthen the Treaty and its implementation.

10. States parties must do more to enhance public awareness of the issue, paying particular attention to young people. The international community could not allow the younger generation to experience first-hand the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons. Thailand fulfilled its responsibility to promote credible and sustained public education in order to continue supporting nuclear disarmament. Commemorating the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons with events such as the 2014 public-speaking contest held on the subject in Thailand, could provide important awareness-raising occasions worldwide. The time had come for nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike to be courageous, creative and flexible and to move forward in a constructive manner.

11. **Ms. Tiemoko Ousmane** (Niger) said that despite the horrific consequences of the use of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and almost 50 years after the Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force, its implementation was far from satisfactory. While the main nuclear-weapon States had made commendable

efforts to reduce their arsenals, the facts showed that much remained to be done. The disarmament process provided for under the Treaty and the implementation of the decisions and resolutions adopted at previous Review Conferences were at a standstill.

12. The Conference on Disarmament, which was intended to devise recommendations for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, was at an impasse, and there remained clear divisions on the adoption of an international convention on the total elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (fissile material cut-off treaty). The universal ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was yet to be achieved and the call for greater transparency on the part of nuclear-weapon States was still unheeded. Furthermore, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty could not be implemented, despite its 183 States parties and 164 ratifications, because the 8 States whose signature was indispensable for its entry into force refused to take that decisive step.

13. The High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 2011, which reflected the attention that should be given to nuclear weapons and nuclear security, had served as a reminder of the ever-present danger and risk of possible nuclear catastrophes haunting humanity. As they had done at the current Review Conference, many delegations at that meeting had underscored that the security of a few should not be ensured at the expense of a world completely free of nuclear weapons. The Niger shared the view that nuclear weapons were equipment and machines and, consequently, not fail safe in the event of an accident. Furthermore, there was no guarantee that criminal organizations operating in many regions, which were also at the forefront in communications technology, could not hack into nuclear weapon security systems and annihilate all of humanity.

14. Her delegation therefore hoped that the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty's entry into force would be celebrated in a world free of nuclear weapons or one in which, at the very least, concrete action had been taken to reflect the firm engagement to eliminate them. The Niger remained committed to achieving the vital objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and supported any initiative to that end, be it unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. That was why,

despite its vast uranium deposits and significant financing for development needs, the Niger had readily acceded to the Treaty, to other major instruments relating to radioactive material, and the relevant IAEA agreements.

15. The essential provisions of the Treaty, the principles and objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation adopted in 1995, the 13 steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, and all relevant General Assembly resolutions must be fully implemented.

16. **Mr. Badr** (Egypt) said that Egypt attached the highest priority to global, non-discriminatory, verifiable nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound manner, and was deeply concerned at the continuous threat posed to humanity by the existence of nuclear weapons. The total elimination of those weapons remained dependent upon fulfilment by nuclear-weapon States of their obligations under article VI and the achievement of universal adherence to the Treaty. The status of nuclear-weapon States had been intended as a transitional status, and any assumption that the indefinite extension of the Treaty meant that nuclear-weapon States should continue to possess those weapons indefinitely was contrary to the spirit and letter of the Treaty. Furthermore, the Middle East had and would continue to have special status within the Treaty framework and its review process, as evidenced by the resolution on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, both adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

17. However, the 13 steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference and the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, both identifying specific actions to promote nuclear disarmament, were yet to be implemented. Indeed, the role of nuclear weapons in the military and security doctrines of nuclear-weapon States had remained largely the same, with several States reaffirming their belief that nuclear weapons were the ultimate guarantee of their security. The pursuit of billion-dollar programmes to modernize stockpiles signalled long-term reliance on nuclear weapons. The incessant attempts to introduce new interpretations according to which article VI left

nuclear disarmament to the discretion of some States called into question the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament and undermined the credibility and utility of the Treaty.

18. Egypt was deeply concerned at the persistent lack of compliance with nuclear disarmament obligations and called for the fulfilment of the obligations under article VI without any further delay. The obligations under the Treaty came as a package of commitments which, when implemented, along with relevant decisions adopted at Review Conferences, would collectively contribute to the Treaty's effectiveness; anything to the contrary would undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty.

19. The international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons had brought unprecedented attention to and raised awareness of the sheer scale of the impact of even a single nuclear detonation and the inability of the international community to respond adequately to the consequences of such detonation. Egypt fully supported the pledge presented by Austria at the conference held in Vienna in 2014. The Committee should give due consideration to the humanitarian perspective as a central component of the march towards the de-legitimization of nuclear weapons and their total elimination.

20. His Government strongly endorsed the negotiation of a convention for the total and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, under effective multilateral verification and control. The 2015 Review Conference must build on that, starting, if necessary, with the negotiation of a treaty banning the manufacture, possession, transfer and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. He drew attention to the working paper submitted to the Conference by the New Agenda Coalition (NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 9), which included four options for possible effective measures to nuclear disarmament.

21. The 2010 Review Conference had recognized the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to receive legally binding negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon States pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances should be pursued as a matter of priority. In that regard, the Conference on Disarmament should begin negotiations on a fissile

material cut-off treaty, in accordance with the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, within an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. To be effective, such a treaty should cover all existing fissile material stocks and create conditions under which nuclear-weapon States would not be able to produce further nuclear weapons or explosive devices.

22. Egypt recommended that the Committee should review the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations, taking into account relevant obligations adopted at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. It should call for the prompt and full implementation of the 2010 action plan on nuclear disarmament in a time-bound manner, and urge nuclear-weapon States to fully comply with their obligations under the Treaty and live up to their unequivocal nuclear disarmament commitments. In addition, it should agree on measures and a time frame for the immediate implementation of article VI of the Treaty. He underscored the need for all parties to demonstrate the political will necessary to achieve progress during the Committee's deliberations.

23. **Mr. Isnomo** (Indonesia), noting that the implementation of article VI of the Treaty had fallen short of expectations, said that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. In the light of their destructive capacity and the potential catastrophe that would result from their intentional use or accidental detonation, his delegation expected the humanitarian dimension and impact of nuclear weapons to be adequately reflected in the outcome document of the 2015 Review Conference. Against such a grim backdrop, nuclear disarmament should be prioritized, not sacrificed for the sake of progress on non-proliferation issues; the two pillars were, in fact, mutually reinforcing and should be pursued simultaneously.

24. Nuclear-weapon States were obliged to pursue the dismantling of their existing nuclear arsenals within a specified time frame and with the same vigour and purpose as in their non-proliferation efforts. Indonesia fully supported the proposal made by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty regarding the specified time frame for nuclear disarmament. In the absence of a comprehensive and non-discriminatory nuclear weapons convention, the Treaty remained the cornerstone of the

non-proliferation and disarmament machinery. Indonesia urged nuclear-weapon States not to backpedal on their commitment. To date, States parties had yet to answer the international call for complete disarmament and a world without nuclear weapons, let alone agree on a tangible date of its implementation.

25. To strengthen the Treaty, a paradigm shift was needed in the strategic view of the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines. Possession of nuclear weapons and nuclear aspirations were the common denominators among State actors that irrationally defied international norms, most particularly humanitarian norms. That State actors redirected valuable resources from otherwise productive sectors into building destructive devices made very little sense.

26. Nuclear weapons gave a false guarantee of security, or even supremacy, both to the possessing country and to those under its nuclear umbrella. In reality, a nuclear arsenal escalated the threat factor exponentially, as the mere existence of nuclear weapons opened the possibility for them to either fall into the wrong hands or be unintentionally detonated. As a start, nuclear-weapon States should remove nuclear weapons and nuclear options from their strategic doctrines, while constructively collaborating with other nations to devise a convention banning the use, testing and production or development of nuclear weapons.

27. Proud of its tradition as a non-nuclear-weapon State, Indonesia had consistently endeavoured to play a leading role in promoting a world free of nuclear weapons. In 2012, as an Annex 2 country, it had completed the ratification process for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and since 2013 had worked with partner States to ensure the early entry into force and universal ratification of that Treaty. In that regard, it called on all States that had not yet ratified the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, especially the Annex 2 countries, to do so without delay. As long as that Treaty and its monitoring system were not legally operational, nuclear threats to international peace and security would continue to exist.

28. All non-nuclear-weapon States deserved legally binding, negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon States, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Providing those security assurances was a tangible step towards nuclear disarmament. In that

regard, Indonesia fully supported the implementation of General Assembly resolution 69/58. Any delay or effort to prevent negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament was contrary to the decision taken by the previous Review Conferences.

29. The objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be achieved only when there was concrete, balanced and non-discriminatory action on all its three pillars. States parties must bear in mind that an indefinite extension of the Treaty did not imply indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States, nor did it imply the indefinite preservation of non-member status for countries outside the Treaty. The universalization of the Treaty, with full implementation of its provisions, and the total elimination of the world's nuclear arsenal were the only true guarantors of a world free of the nuclear menace. It was time to think sensibly for future generations. In that regard, he welcomed the accession of the State of Palestine to the Treaty, which was a sign that the desire for peace was still alive.

30. **Mr. Momen** (Bangladesh) said that his country's long-standing position on nuclear disarmament was unambiguous: nuclear weapons did not guarantee global security, but only endangered humanity and increased fear and uncertainty. The various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly envisioning a world free of nuclear weapons were yet to be fully implemented. Nuclear weapons were still being upgraded and stockpiled in large numbers. A handful of States insensitive to the security of the majority of citizens, including their own, still sought to possess nuclear weapons, giving themselves a false sense of security. While billions of people were underfed and still did not enjoy fundamental rights, billions of dollars were being wasted on nuclear arms build-up. He asked whether that could be justified, given the aspirations for a pro-people, pro-planet, inclusive and sustainable future for all.

31. Bangladesh remained committed to the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and had signed all of the major multilateral disarmament treaties, in line with its constitutional obligations. It supported the effective implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty, which was an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. He urged nuclear-weapon States to fulfil in good faith their long-overdue legal obligations under article VI and to comply with

undertakings outlined in the 13 steps and in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, in particular action 5.

32. The time had come to conclude a comprehensive convention to guarantee a world free of nuclear weapons; that would require the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 68/32. Nuclear-weapon States must pursue disarmament in a time-bound manner. The entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, to which Bangladesh was a State party, was an essential step towards a nuclear-free world. He therefore called on all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify it. It was also imperative to commence, without further delay, negotiations on an effective, non-discriminatory legally binding and effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty that included existing stocks.

33. Despite living in the shadow of its nuclear neighbours, Bangladesh had opted to remain non-nuclear. The objective of disarmament could only be achieved by building confidence through appropriate measures and by demonstrating the necessary political will and conducting effective multilateral diplomacy between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

34. **Mr. Ibrahim** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that non-nuclear-weapon States had accepted rights and obligations under the Treaty on the understanding that they would be offered negative security assurances, and that the ultimate objective was the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, some nuclear-weapon States had been backpedalling on their commitments. Furthermore, by continually undermining multilateralism, obstructing the mechanisms of the Treaty in their pursuit of a monopoly on power, and imposing double standards in non-proliferation issues, they posed a serious threat to international peace and security.

35. The Treaty had not succeeded in eliminating the nuclear weapon threat or consolidating security. Some nuclear-weapon States refused to provide legally binding security assurances and acted irresponsibly. Previous Review Conferences had adopted decisions and resolutions, all of equal significance, that were integral to the Treaty regime. A prime example was the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely with the aim of attaining nuclear disarmament.

36. The current Review Conference must adopt a frank and clear position on achieving universal ratification of the Treaty and examine the serious violations thereof by some nuclear-weapon States that offered nuclear weapons and expertise and assistance to entities that were not parties to the Treaty. That was the case of Israel, to which some nuclear-weapon States gave cover to develop its nuclear arsenal, posing a threat to its region and the world. The Conference must also take a decisive stand on positive security assurances. He called on nuclear-weapon States to cease their double standards, procrastination and irresponsible actions, and to work towards attaining the objectives of the Treaty.

37. **Mr. van der Kwast** (Netherlands) said that his country remained firmly engaged on the road towards a world without nuclear weapons. The best way to reach that goal was via a step-by-step approach, taking practical and concrete measures while pairing ambition with realism. That implied working harder and at multiple levels. Progress had been made in a number of areas. The continuing implementation, even in the current geopolitical climate, of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) had led those two countries to reduce their strategic arsenals to their lowest level in more than 50 years, while the United Kingdom and France had also unilaterally reduced their arsenals.

38. Reporting by the permanent members of the Security Council on their nuclear-weapon programmes was positive for transparency. While the quality of those reports differed and greater detail would be welcome, it had been a step in the right direction. Similar efforts to enhance transparency included visits to air force bases and the publication of the glossary on key nuclear terms, which could be improved.

39. The collaboration between Norway and the United Kingdom to examine technical and procedural challenges regarding a possible future nuclear disarmament verification regime, and the new International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification led by the United States, were constructive and useful initiatives. Furthermore, the group of governmental experts established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 67/53 had produced a substantial consensus report, providing the necessary groundwork for the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off

treaty. He hoped the report could help to bring about the immediate start of negotiations.

40. Despite those achievements, there was no doubt that more needed to be done. The Netherlands shared in the growing frustration at the slow pace of progress; the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons had been convened out of that frustration. He hoped that the momentum gained from those conferences could give a fresh impetus to disarmament and would enable States parties to take the necessary steps towards “global zero” at the current Review Conference. At the same time, security and stability considerations could not be ignored. Geopolitical developments should be taken into account, but they should not be a reason to stop nuclear disarmament. Moreover, while article VI should be taken seriously, his delegation did not agree that it contained a “legal gap”. It was up to the States parties to seek consensus on a common way forward in the further implementation of that article.

41. He recalled that the issue of nuclear-sharing had been addressed during the Treaty negotiations; at which time basing arrangements existed and had been made clear to delegations and the public, and that weapons assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remained under the national control of a nuclear-weapon State at all times and were never transferred. Therefore, NATO basing arrangements were fully compatible with the Treaty obligations of NATO allies. NATO also remained fully committed to working towards a world without nuclear weapons.

42. Moving forward, States parties should focus on finding common ground and continue to build on the consensus on the 2010 action plan. They should take stock of current achievements and hold an honest debate about the actions that had not yet been implemented and the underlying causes. The Netherlands was open to identifying new actions, provided they helped to move towards “global zero”. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, of which the Netherlands was a member, had submitted a working paper to the Conference (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.16) outlining several proposals on the way forward.

43. **Mr. Kucer** (Slovakia), reiterating the importance his country placed on the nuclear disarmament pillar, said that all States must actively contribute to the disarmament process in order to maintain and

strengthen international security. In accordance with the goals of the Treaty, Slovakia actively supported and promoted a world without nuclear weapons based on the principle of undiminished security for all. However, it was concerned that recent tensions in Europe had been accompanied by increasing references to a possible role for nuclear weapons. Efforts to downgrade the role of nuclear weapons in security strategies and defence doctrines were, therefore, necessary and should accompany reductions of nuclear arsenals.

44. Greater attention was being paid to the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, an important element of the complex discourse on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. However, in working towards prevention of the use of nuclear weapons, it was also vital to focus on the reasons for the existence of those weapons. The substantive and constructive participation of nuclear-weapon States was needed if nuclear arsenals were to be eliminated. Without the engagement of relevant stakeholders, no ban would guarantee the desired results.

45. To make progress on nuclear disarmament, it was vital to work towards a set of legally binding instruments which would underpin a commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Slovakia therefore supported the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Such a treaty would offer a unique opportunity to create a non-discriminatory regime with equal obligations for both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. It would also enhance nuclear material security and further strengthen common efforts to prevent such material from falling into the hands of terrorists. Furthermore, when based on the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verification, with maximized non-proliferation and disarmament value, it would clearly reinforce the global non-proliferation regime and would be well placed in a comprehensive framework of necessary building blocks.

46. However, setting strict preconditions for defining the scope of deliberations and prejudging their outcomes would only serve to delay the start of negotiations. On the contrary, only true negotiation could reveal the issues to be addressed, and the manner in which that should be done, thus leading to the desired outcome. The work of the group of governmental experts was therefore of great value in preparation for future negotiations on a fissile material

cut-off treaty. His delegation looked forward to reading the full report on the group's work and supported the recommendation that the Review Conference should reaffirm the need to commence negotiations on the treaty without delay, preferably in the Conference on Disarmament.

47. **Ms. Kasnaklı** (Turkey) said that Turkey remained fully committed to the objectives, provisions, strengthening and universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons would be unattainable without the successful and universal implementation of the Treaty regime. Throughout the review cycle, Turkey had engaged with its Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative partners to promote the implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference.

48. Turkey had closely followed developments pertaining to nuclear disarmament, including the noteworthy New START Treaty and the announcement of additional arms control measures by certain nuclear-weapon States. Her delegation welcomed those bilateral and unilateral steps and hoped that the United States and the Russian Federation would continue their efforts to achieve further reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

49. Transparency was important and, in that regard, reporting by nuclear-weapon States to the Treaty was a welcome sign of progress; the Initiative had also contributed to the process by drafting report templates. Nevertheless, the frustration stemming from the ineffective implementation of the 2010 action plan could not be ignored. The failure to convene the international conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had been another grave disappointment. Those shortcomings revealed that nuclear disarmament was by no means disconnected from the real world, and was inherently linked to existing tensions among actors, divergent threat perceptions and strategic calculations.

50. Her country's close observation of various trends had pointed to a growing awareness of the need to end the hegemony of nuclear weapons in security and defence policies and doctrines. That growing awareness should be transformed into a general understanding on the part of relevant actors to bring

about the overall and systematic reduction of the dependence on nuclear weapons.

51. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons were a major concern. However, only through a step-by-step process with building blocks could the objective of “global zero” be ultimately attained. Effective, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament took place in a strategic context where undiminished security for all should be upheld as the guiding principle. Mutual trust was the key factor in creating an enabling climate for further practical steps in nuclear disarmament. While coordination among nuclear-weapon States was welcome, addressing the issue of trust between those States and non-nuclear-weapon States was a more serious problem. Negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States represented a viable solution, within the three pillars of the Treaty.

52. The entry into force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would be a significant step forward and would constitute an important building block for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Turkey called upon all States that had not yet ratified the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, especially the Annex 2 countries, to do so. Maintaining the moratorium on nuclear explosion tests was of crucial importance, pending the entry into force of that Treaty. Another building block would be the commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. The successful completion of the report of the group of governmental experts would contribute to the deliberations in the Conference on Disarmament.

53. **Mr. Sano** (Japan), speaking also on behalf of 72 other countries, said that it was important to increase awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, the risks associated with nuclear proliferation and the ways to overcome those challenges. Educating younger generations was of particular importance, as it could help to strengthen all aspects of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and foster a global culture of peace and security.

54. States parties should demonstrate their commitment to implementing the recommendations contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) and those contained in the action plan adopted at the same Review Conference. The Final Document had underscored the

importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the Treaty, and encouraged all States parties to implement the recommendations contained in the 2002 report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education (A/57/124).

55. States had repeatedly reaffirmed their commitments in that regard by adopting the biennial General Assembly resolutions on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education and the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme. Disarmament and non-proliferation education called for the use of new information and communications technologies, such as social media, and cooperation and collaboration between Governments and international, regional and civil society organizations. Seventy years after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 2015 Review Conference offered an opportunity for States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to advance their vision of a secure and peaceful world free of nuclear weapons by maximizing the potential of education.

56. **Mr. Al-Nisf** (Qatar) said that the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was dependent on the sense of security it was able to provide. The 1995 extension of the Treaty was not an invitation to nuclear-weapon States to maintain their huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons; all States should join the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons in line with article VI. The adoption of various steps and measures at successive conferences to promote disarmament was a reflection of the limited progress that had been made in that regard. While some unilateral and bilateral measures had resulted in the reduction of stockpiles, it was unacceptable that there were still enough nuclear weapons in the world to destroy life on earth many times over.

57. The fact that many States continued to include nuclear weapons in their defence doctrines and to study ways of increasing the destructive power of those weapons was a matter of serious concern, particularly in light of the increased international focus on the potential humanitarian consequences of such weapons. His delegation welcomed the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that had taken place in 2013 and 2014 and called for the implementation of the recommendations adopted at those conferences.

58. The extent to which the resolutions from the Review Conferences of 1995, 2000 and 2010 had been implemented should be reviewed, including by identifying obstacles to implementation and ways of overcoming them. Nuclear-weapon States must enter into consultations in good faith and take decisive steps to rid the world of nuclear weapons within a concrete time frame. In the meantime, they must provide assurances against the use of nuclear weapons. As the International Court of Justice had indicated in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the detonation of a nuclear weapon would be contrary to the rules of international humanitarian law. As long as nuclear weapons existed, they could end up in the hands of terrorists. The time had come to ward off the spectre of a nuclear attack and ensure that nuclear technology was used exclusively to serve the progress, not the destruction, of humanity.

59. **Mr. AlAjmi** (Kuwait) said that the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty depended on there being an equal emphasis on its three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The ultimate goal must be for all States Members of the United Nations to be non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The continued failure by nuclear-weapon States to implement the 13 steps adopted in 2005 and the 2010 action plan was a matter of concern.

60. His delegation welcomed General Assembly resolution 69/58 on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament and the comments made by various delegations on the need to ensure the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Conference on Disarmament should formulate a comprehensive and balanced programme of work for negotiations on a comprehensive agreement prohibiting the possession, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The agreement should set out a plan for the elimination of existing nuclear weapons in a time-bound and verifiable manner. Additionally, the Conference should negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty and establish international arrangements for non-nuclear-weapon States to be given unconditional and legally binding security assurances.

61. **Mr. Khelif** (Algeria) said that the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were of equal importance.

It would be impossible to implement the Treaty without better cooperation between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States. While progress had certainly been made in the area of non-proliferation, the issue of disarmament was a source of frustration and concern, owing to the slow pace of action and the lack of transparency from the States with the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons.

62. Algeria had experienced nuclear tests on its territory and was thus well acquainted with the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. The three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons had built on the very first resolution adopted by the General Assembly, resolution 1(I) (1946), and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was disappointing that, 45 years after the entry into force of the Treaty, its article VI, the practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference and the disarmament measures in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference had yet to be implemented, owing to a lack of political will from wealthy States and the absence of a specific time frame. In fact, nuclear deterrence policies seemed to have regained acceptance, a development that was entirely contrary to the objectives of the Treaty and the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

63. A multilateral, binding instrument banning nuclear weapons, accompanied by a schedule for their complete elimination, was a viable option. General Assembly resolution 69/58 and the working paper on draft elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted to the 2015 Review Conference by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty (NPT/CONF/2015.WP.14) could provide guidance in that regard. The authority and credibility of the Treaty would best be achieved through an open and sincere dialogue; simply reaffirming the validity of the commitments undertaken at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences would not be enough to enhance compliance.

64. His delegation had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.52), which contained a number of recommendations that it would like to see reflected in the final document of the 2015 Review Conference.

65. **Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons, said that the only solution to the potential use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination and a universal, legally binding assurance that they would never again be produced. Until that objective was achieved, non-nuclear-weapon States had a legitimate right to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable negative security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It was a matter of concern that the assurances given by nuclear-weapon States continued to be limited, conditional and insufficient.

66. The indefinite extension of the Treaty did not imply that nuclear-weapon States could indefinitely retain their nuclear arsenals. Such an assumption undermined the integrity and sustainability of the non-proliferation regime and the overarching objective of international peace and security. Nuclear-weapon States must therefore refrain from the use or threat of use, under any circumstances, of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty.

67. While the Group of Non-aligned States Parties welcomed the convening of the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, it felt that humanitarian considerations must be taken into account in all discussions and efforts relating to disarmament. Any threat or use of nuclear weapons would constitute a crime against humanity and a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Furthermore, the mere possession of nuclear weapons was inconsistent with the principles of international humanitarian law, as confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. The military doctrines of nuclear-weapon States and the strategic concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization therefore gave cause for concern.

68. Pending the conclusion of negotiations on adequate security assurances, all nuclear-weapon States must at least fully respect their existing commitments and extend assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties unconditionally. The 2015 Review Conference should address the lack of political will by nuclear-weapon States to address that legitimate concern of non-nuclear-weapon States as a matter of priority. He drew attention to additional recommendations contained in the working paper on security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons that had been

submitted by the Group to the Conference for consideration (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.2).

69. **Mr. Badr** (Egypt) said that, pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon States must provide unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States through a legally binding instrument. The demand for such assurances was logical, legitimate and predated the Treaty itself. The assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States in the context of Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) were insufficient, given the catastrophic humanitarian impact that a nuclear explosion would have and the inability of States and organizations to control or contain those consequences, as had been demonstrated at the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

70. The shift in position of some nuclear-weapon States on the matter of negative security assurances was welcome. However, non-legally binding measures would never be able to provide adequate security assurances or the mutual trust that were necessary for good international relations. The working paper submitted by the New Agenda Coalition to the 2005 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.61), which included a draft protocol on security assurances, could be taken as a starting point for negotiations.

71. Egypt welcomed all efforts to promote nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and called on all nuclear-weapon States to ratify the relevant protocols without reservations. However, contrary to what had been argued by certain nuclear-weapon States, nuclear-weapon-free zones were in no way an alternative to legally binding security assurances, not least because the zones did not cover all non-nuclear-weapon States.

72. **Mr. Wood** (United States of America) said that his Government had updated and strengthened its long-standing security assurances in 2010, in recognition of the importance of those assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. In its Nuclear Posture Review Report (2010), his Government had stated that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that it was in the interest of all States for the non-use of nuclear weapons to be extended forever. The role of nuclear weapons in

United States defence and security strategies had been reduced significantly in recent decades, and his Government would only consider using nuclear weapons in the most extreme circumstances.

73. His Government supported nuclear-weapon-free zones and was working to extend legally binding negative security assurances to members of those zones. In that regard, the signing by nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk) in May 2014 was welcome. The United States had already ratified the Protocol to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and signed the Protocols to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty). Along with other nuclear-weapon States, it was continuing its efforts to engage with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and hoped it would soon be able to sign the revised Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty).

74. The United States remained committed to those assurances and was prepared to work with other States parties on additional measures that could be taken to assist States, particularly with regard to the response in the event of a State becoming the victim of a terrorist nuclear attack. It encouraged other nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm the security assurances they had given to non-nuclear-weapon States that complied with their obligations under the Treaty, as those States had a legitimate interest in the reliability and credibility of the assurances provided. His delegation hoped that the Review Conference would welcome the reaffirmation by nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to existing negative and positive security assurances regarding the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the continuing efforts by nuclear-weapon States to provide legally binding negative security assurances to nuclear-weapon-free zones, and call for the entry into force of the relevant protocols to the treaties establishing those zones as soon as possible.

75. **Mr. Kmentt** (Austria) said that his Government fully supported the commitment to negative security assurances. The important contribution that members of nuclear-weapon-free zones were making towards achieving a world without nuclear weapons was particularly clear against the backdrop of the new

international focus on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and the risks associated with their existence. His delegation welcomed the recent signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States of various protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and hoped that the 2015 Review Conference would work to further strengthen the role of such zones.

76. His delegation fully supported the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and hoped that the conference on the establishment of that zone would be convened as soon as possible. The crisis in Ukraine and its potential negative repercussions on the Non-Proliferation Treaty were cause for concern. It should be recalled that Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, had received security assurances and assurances of respect for its territorial integrity in the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum).

77. While his country was not a member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, its domestic law prohibited the use of both nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. In response to action 9 of the 2010 action plan, Austria and Switzerland had examined the possibility of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe in more detail and had produced a study that aimed to contribute to the discussion on collective security in Europe in the current context of increasing international tension.

78. Although there was no comprehensive legal norm that outright prohibited the possession, transfer, production and use of nuclear weapons, international environmental law and international health regulations could be applicable to such weapons. Furthermore, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, evidence that had emerged in the past two years regarding the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons cast further doubt on whether such weapons could ever be used without violating international law. In that regard, he drew attention to the working paper on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that his delegation had submitted to the Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.30).

79. **Mr. Pinto Coelho** (Brazil) said that, pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, the conclusion of a treaty providing non-nuclear-weapon States with

unequivocal and legally binding negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon States was a matter of priority. Such assurances would simply reciprocate the commitment from non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire, develop or use nuclear weapons. Interpretative declarations and reservations from nuclear-weapon States regarding the protocols to non-nuclear-weapon-zone treaties must be withdrawn with immediate effect, as they were incompatible with the objectives of those treaties.

80. **Ms. Lv Xin** (China) said that non-nuclear-weapon States deserved security assurances in return for their contribution to the disarmament process and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. Such assurances would not only help maintain the international non-proliferation regime but would also create a more favourable environment for disarmament by enhancing mutual trust between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. The latter's demand for legally binding security assurances was therefore entirely justified and reasonable.

81. Until such a time as nuclear weapons were eliminated, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; they should refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; and should conclude international legal instruments in that regard without delay through the Conference on Disarmament. Her own country had a long-standing and unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. Nuclear-weapon States should decrease the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies and should not target their nuclear weapons against any country or name any country as a potential target for a nuclear strike.

82. China remained open to considering further measures to promote nuclear assurances. It had signed and ratified relevant protocols to the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Pelindaba Treaties, and stood ready to sign the Bangkok Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States should support the efforts on non-nuclear-weapon States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones.

83. **Mr. Uliyanov** (Russian Federation) said that his country was committed to the concept and practice of negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. It had provided those assurances for the

nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa and Central Asia by signing the relevant protocols to the treaties establishing those zones. It stood ready to sign the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty and to provide the required security assurances to members of a future nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

84. The accusations made by the representatives of Ukraine and other States that the Russian Federation had cast doubt on the reliability of its negative security assurances by allegedly violating the Budapest Memorandum and coming close to undermining the Non-Proliferation Treaty were entirely groundless. In reality, the fact that his Government had fully complied with its obligations in a critical situation was proof that it could be trusted to honour its security commitments. In any case, the Budapest Memorandum was a political instrument and, as such, not legally binding. It was inappropriate for the delegations of Canada, Estonia, Germany, Poland and the United States to use the Review Conference as a forum for unscrupulous speculation. Those delegations should refrain from undermining the non-proliferation regime for short-term political reasons.

85. The Russian Federation had fully complied with its obligations under the Budapest Memorandum in Ukraine and had not used military force in Crimea. The allegations of a Russian military intervention in Ukraine had not been supported by compelling evidence. In fact, virtually all the people of Crimea had exercised their right to self-determination and expressed their wish to return to Russia. It should be noted that the Russian Federation had not, in the Budapest Memorandum or in any other instrument, made a commitment to force any region of Ukraine to remain a part of that State against the will of the local population. The territorial loss incurred by Ukraine was the result of a complex internal process that had nothing to do with the Russian Federation or its obligations under the Memorandum.

86. It would not be advisable to take Ukraine as a model with regard to non-proliferation policy, as the representative of that State had suggested, in light of the recent alarming statements from senior Ukrainian officials, such as the announcement by former Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov in April 2015 that the Ukrainian authorities were preparing to implement secret programmes to develop a "dirty bomb" or nuclear weapons. Given that such statements were

generally made by terrorist groups, it would be worth considering including a warning to the Ukrainian authorities in the final document of the 2015 Review Conference against taking any steps that would turn their country into a rogue State.

*The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.*